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Abstract
We study coalitional games where the coalitional payos depend on
the entire coalition structure. The recursive core (K oczy, 2007) is a gen-
eralisation of the coalition structure core for such games.
We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model
and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive
core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced
(understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency
that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that
are never reached are ignored.
Subject classication: C71, C72
Keywords and phrases: partition function, externalities, implementa-
tion, recursive core, stationary perfect equilibrium, time consistent equi-
librium
1 Introduction
Throughout its history the theory of coalitional games has mostly focussed on
the study of games with orthogonal coalitions, that is, coalitions, which can be
studied independently of each other. The most obvious example is the com-
monest form of a TU-game with a characteristic function that assigns a payo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1to a coalition disregarding other players and coalitions. When we look at the
usual interpretations of coalitions, be those trading blocks (Yi, 1996), trusts
(Bloch, 1995) or international environmental agreements (Funaki and Yamato,
1999; Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003), the orthogonality assumption is dicult
to maintain; we believe it is the exception rather than the rule that coalitions
can be studied independently of each other.
Since the seminal paper of Thrall and Lucas (1963) introducing the parti-
tion function form numerous cooperative approaches and solution concepts have
been proposed to solve games with externalities, but in the absence of an im-
plementation by non-cooperative equilibria these remain interesting heuristics
(Chander and Tulkens, 1995; Ray and Vohra, 1997; Hyndman and Ray, 2007).
For games with orthogonal coalitions the implementation of cooperative solution
concepts, such as the core has an extensive literature (Chatterjee et al., 1993;
Laguno, 1994; Perry and Reny, 1994), but these results do not directly gen-
eralise to games with externalities. In this domain Huang and Sj ostr om (2006)
and K oczy (2009) have provided partial results that are limited to games with
non-empty cores in all subgames, or, in terms of sequential coalition formation
games: to games with stationary perfect equilibria. It turns out that perfectness
is a very demanding condition and the implementation might fail even for simple
TU games. We therefore introduce a generalisation, subgame-consistency, and
show that the set of partitions formed under the resulting equilibria coincides
with the recursive core.
Subgame-consistency is a weaker concept than subgame-perfectness, but
more demanding than time-consistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). If we
dene each of these concepts in corresponding sets of subgames, for subgame-
perfectness all subgames are relevant, while for time-consistency only the sub-
games on the equilibrium path. In particular subgame-perfect equilibria are also
subgame-consistent and subgame-consistent equilibria are also time-consistent.
Moreover stationary perfect equilibria are stationary consistent. For more on
the relation of subgame-perfect and time-consistent strategies see Fershtman
(1989) and Asilis (1995).
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction a long second
section follows introducing both the cooperative and noncooperative theories to
2solve games in partition function form, we introduce the notation and simple
terminology we are going to use. We present the cooperative solution, namely
the recursive core and similarly the noncooperative coalition formation game
and its equilibria. A novel equilibrium concept, subgame consistency and the
corresponding notion of relevant subgame are also introduced here. We state
and prove our main result in the third section. The paper ends with a brief
conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
Let N denote the set of players. Subsets are called coalitions. A partition S of
S is a splitting of S into disjoint coalitions. (S) denotes the set of partitions
of S. In general we use capital and calligraphic letters to denote a set and its
partition (the set of players N being an exception), indexed capital letters are
elements of the partition. We write i 2 S if there exists Sk such that i 2 Sk 2 S
and if i 2 S we write S(i) for the coalition embedded in S containing i.
The game (N;V ) is given by the player set N and a partition function (Thrall
and Lucas, 1963) V : (N) ! (2N ! R), where V (Si;S) denotes the payo for
coalition Si in case partition S forms. For vectors x;y 2 RN we write xS for
the restriction to the set S and xS > yS if xi  yi for all i 2 S  N and there
exists j 2 S such that xj > yj.
The pair ! = (x;P) consisting of a payo vector x 2 RN and a partition
P 2 (N) is a payo conguration (or outcome) if
P
i2S xi = V (P;P) for all
P 2 P. The set of outcomes of game (N;V ) is denoted 
(N;V ).
Our main result is the equivalence of the partitions produced by certain
noncooperative coalition formation game and a cooperative solution concept.
In the following we spell out these approaches.
2.1 Recursive core
The rst model is a cooperative solution concept, a generalisation of the core
to games in partition function form. The core is dened in terms of deviations,
but unlike in games with orthogonal coalitions, in games with externalities the
protability of a deviation can only be determined once the partition of the
3remaining, residual players is also known, or at least some assumption is formu-
lated about their behaviour. While most of the approaches (see K oczy, 2007,
for further references) tried to get rid of the externalities and solve the game as
a characteristic function form game, Huang and Sj ostr om (2003) and (K oczy,
2007) assume that these residual players play a residual game that is a game
on its own and thus can be solved using the same concept. Once the solution
of this game is known, we know which partition is formed, and then it is also
possible to tell the deviating players' payos. If this partition is not unique
(or not determined, in case the residual core is empty) K oczy (2007) considers
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios depending on the deviating players' expec-
tations regarding these alternatives. Our results will apply to the pessimistic
case, so only this version of the denition is given.
First we introduce residual games and then the recursive core:
Denition 1 (Residual Game). Let (N;V ) be a game and consider the set
L ( N of live players. Assume K = N nL have committed to form partition K.
Then the residual game (L;V K) is the partition function form game over the
player set L and with the partition function V K : L ! (2L ! R), where
V K(C;L) = V (C;L [ K) 8C;L : C 2 L 2 L: (2.1)
The residual game is derived from the original game using the partition K, but
it is a partition function game on its own. So if we use the core to solve (N;V ),
we must also use it to solve (L;V K): Deviating coalitions must expect a residual
core outcome to form. Should the core be empty this solution does not present a
selection of the outcomes, and all possible responses must be considered. Even if
the residual core is non-empty it may contain payo congurations with dierent
partitions. This gives rise the the following denition.
Denition 2 (Recursive core). Let (N;V ) be a partition function form game.
1. Trivial game. The core of (f1g;V ) is the only outcome with the trivial









2. Inductive assumption: The core C(N;V ) has been dened for all games





C(N;V ) if C(N;V ) 6= ?

(N;V ) otherwise.
3. Dominance. The outcome (x;P) is dominated via the coalition K forming
partition K if for all assumptions (yL;L) 2 A(L;V K) of the remaining set
of players L = N nK there exists an outcome ((yK;yL);K[L) 2 
(N;V )
such that yK > xK.
The outcome (x;P) is dominated if it is dominated via a coalition.
4. Core. The core, denoted C(N;V ), is the set of undominated outcomes.
A partition is only dominated via a coalition if the deviation of this coali-
tion (as a partition) is protable for every residual (core) partition. When the
residual core is empty, we have no information about the solution of the resid-
ual game, so we assume that any reaction is possible. As such, we do not, for
instance, exclude inecient partitions { just as the sequential game will be free
from such limitations in Equation 2.3. Our results, however, generalise to such
modications { as long as they are introduced in both models. For a general
discussion of the properties of the recursive core see K oczy (2007).
In the following we simply refer to the recursive core as core and to the
(recursive) core of a residual game as residual core.
2.2 Sequential coalition formation
In the following we describe the noncooperative coalition formation game that,
together with an appropriate equilibrium concept will implement the recursive
core. Our setup is closest to the models of (Bloch, 1996) and Perry and Reny
(1994).
We begin with a brief, informal description. The purpose of the game is to
form coalitions as this is the only way players can collect payos. Coalitions
can form with unanimous agreement of the members: a member proposes a
coalition and the rest one-by-one accept. Such agreements must also specify the
distribution of the coalitional payos, which, in turn, are only determined once
the game ends and the complete partition forms. Following Huang and Sj ostr om
5Figure 1: Stationary decision with beliefs
(2006) we assume that a proposal also species the percentual distribution of
the payo among the members of the coalition. For eciency reasons we allow
for the simultaneous formation of coalitions (See also K oczy, 2009). When a
coalition forms, its members leave the game.
We are interested in self-conrming strategies of this game. It is common to
study stationary-perfect equilibria, but here perfectness turns out to be too
strong a condition and therefore we introduce the somewhat weaker notion
of subgame-consistency that requires the perfectness property only in relevant
subgames. We insist on stationarity, but allow players to form beliefs about
history: their actions may thus depend not only on the status quo, but also on
the common belief, decided by nature.
The decision at each node can therefore be described as on Figure 1. At
a node there may be several possible moves each of which are optimal for a
dierent history. Also here, the player should follow the dotted arrow, but,
due to stationarity the decision can only be conditional on the belief. The
possibility, however is there that the right action is chosen, as the belief can
possibly coincide with the true history.
In the following we formalise the model.
The sequential coalition formation game (N;V ) is dened over the same
6player set N and the same partition function V , but the game is played in an
entirely dierent way. Without loss of generality we assume 0 < minP;S V (S;P)
therefore staying in the game forever is never optimal.
1. Initially all players are active and no proposals have been made.
2. Player i makes a proposal to an active subset S 3 i of the players specifying
a partition S as well as a distribution of the coalitional values.
3. If it is attractive, players in S accept the proposal one-by-one.
4. When all players have accepted, the proposed coalitions form and leave
the game.
5. The coalitions that have left receive some payment based on what they
have already earned, that is, the minimal payment for these coalitions in
any embedding partition taking the exited coalitions given.
6. The belief about the order of exits of departed coalitions is updated by
nature; the game continues with the remaining players with Step 2.
7. If a proposal is not attractive, the invited players do not accept it and
another proposal is made. Return to Step 2.1
8. If all players have left, the game ends.
Proposals A proposal p = (T ;w) 2 T  [0;1]T by player i is oered to a
set of players T 3 i, where T  N n K specifying a partition T 2 T and
a distribution w of coalitional payos in each of the coalitions in T such that
P
i2Ti wi = 1 for all Ti 2 T . The vector w species the share of the payo a
particular player will receive, the actual payment is only known once the payo
of the coalition can be determined. Specifying individual payos adds only
complexity to the model (Huang and Sj ostr om, 2006).
The set of proposals available to i are denoted Pi while P collects all possible
proposals.
1Here we use the assumption that there are plenty of opportunities to accept a proposal so
if a player does not, but allows another one to make another proposal, then he is essentially
rejecting it. Bloch (1996) only allows the rejecting player to make a proposal, but with this
assumption our setup is essentially the same.
7History The game is specied in an extensive form, where decisions are made
at each node. History, denoted ht at time t encompasses the entire activity log
of the game including proposals made, acceptances if any, which coalitions have
left etc.
Time's passing has no relevance here, so we drop the reference in the nota-
tion. We can, however say that if h1  h2, then h1 happened before h2.
History has more data we will ever need, among others it contains.
 the set of players K(h) =
S
S2K(h) S  N who have already left the game
forming partition K(h) 2 K(h),
 the set of feasible proposals P(h) = f(T ;w) 2 P jT  N n K(h)g and
Pi(h) = P(h) \ Pi,
 the current proposal p(h) = (T (h);w(h)) 2 P(h),
 the distribution rule for the quit players w(h) 2 RN, where we set wi(h) =
1
jLj for all i 62 K,
 the set of players A(h)  T(h) who have already accepted the proposal,
 and nally (h) the belief at node h.
The set of histories is denoted by H.
When a history h has been reached, all future histories can only be extensions
of h. The set of such feasible histories is denoted Hh = fh0 2 H jh  h0g.
Strategies Strategy i of player i is a mapping from H to his actions set:
i(h) 2 Pi(h) [ faccept;waitg: (2.2)
We assume that making or accepting a proposal is preceded and followed by
a nonempty open passive interval of time. This is to ensure that other players
have a chance to react. Further, we assume
1. Initially there is no active proposal so \accept" is the same as \wait".
2. The same applies if i accepts a proposal (T ;w), while i 62 T .
3. Actions of departed players are ignored.
84. A new proposal cancels the previous proposal: if it was not accepted,
by our assumption this is due to lack of interest not shortage of time.
Here the question whether a race-to-react could realise in some situations.
Fortunately the answer is no, in equilibrium this will not happen, but to
see this we rst must specify payo (the incentives to play the game) and
the equilibrium concept.
We denote the restriction of  to a subgame corresponding to history h by h.
Beliefs In games with externalities stationary information is not sucient to
achieve stable outcomes. Indeed a departed player's payo is partly determined
by the actions of the remaining players allowing the latter to punish deviations.
A strategy will typically specify punishment strategies o equilibrium, but whom
should one punish depends on the history, that is not available when stationary
strategies are selected. Instead players form a common belief on whom should
be punished. The belief is common to all players, and is decided by nature and
is updated each time a player leaves a game.
For all h, the belief (h) at h is a subset of the departed coalitions, (h) 
K(h). As for strategies, the restriction of  to subgame h is denoted by h. The
set of beliefs is denoted B, the set of restrictions to h by Bh.
In equilibrium the outcome of the game will not depend on beliefs, but
to make the inuence of recollections more explicit in general, the outcome
resulting from the strategy prole  and the recollection-function  can be
written as !(;). Kreps and Wilson (1982) use expectations to aggregate
results from dierent beliefs, we use the conservativism of the players: They
focus on the worst outcomes, essentially trying to minimise loss.
Payos Not all players will necessarily leave the game { if so, the departed
players form a coalition structure that is not a partition and therefore the coali-
tional payos are ill-dened. Assuming that players are careful, conservative
and thus always look out for the worst case and with a slight abuse of notation





minPP(;) V (S;P) S 2 P(;)
0 otherwise.
(2.3)
In addition to the coalitional payos, the strategies also determine the in-
dividual ones. Let xi(;) denote the payo of player i in case the strategy
prole  is played and  is the belief function. Formally
xi(;) = wi(;)V (P(;;i);P(;)); or (2.4)
xi() = min
02Bh wi(;0)V (P(;0;i);P(;0)); (2.5)
as a function of strategies only.2
Before we proceed to study equilibria we introduce some additional notation.





minh2Bh wi(h)V (K(h;i);K(h) [ P(h;h)) if i 2 K(h)
minh2Bh wi(h;h)V (P(h;h;i);K(h) [ P(h;h)) otherwise
(2.6)
Now suppose that at history h there is a proposal p = (D;w). For a player
i 2 D, should the proposal be accepted the payo becomes
xi(;D;w;h) = min
h2Bh wiV (D(i);K(h) [ D [ P(facceptg [ h
 i;h)): (2.7)
Finally we introduce the following notation: Suppose x() and y() are
payo vectors. We say that x is larger than y for all  2 B and write x(B) >
y(B) if x()  y() for all  2 B and there exists  2 B such that x() > y().
Equilibria Now that we have specied the available strategies (actions), the
resulting payos (incentives) we can focus on the outcomes of the coalition
formation game. We hope to answer two questions simultaneously: (i) which
2Bloch (1996) considers optimistic players: vi(P()) = maxPK vi(P) for i 2 P(). How-
ever, a deviation (a concept we formalise later) is protable if it is weakly protable to all
players. Suppose this deviation creates a subgame where any of the partitions might form.
Optimistic players expect the best: a partition benecial to the deviation will form. Bloch's
players' optimism goes further, they individually hope the best: a deviation may appear prof-
itable even if for every single possible reaction someone is worse o. Pessimism is consistent
in this sense: a deviation K is protable for K if and only if it is protable for each player in
K and for each possible partition.
10coalitions will form (ii) how are coalitional payos distributed. We look for
strategies that do not need revisions, but are nal already as the game starts
and for strategies that are stationary, that is, do not depend on time, but only
on the current state of the game. In nonstationary strategies the set of equilibria
may be too inclusive; for a discussion of folk-theorem-like results see Muthoo
(1990, 1995); Perry and Reny (1994); Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
Denition 3. A strategy is stationary if it does not depend on history, if for
all i and for all histories h;h0 2 H such that K(h) = K(h0) and p(h) = p(h0) we
have i(h) = i(h0).
Such strategies only depend on the current state s = (K;p), a pair consisting of
the partition K of departed players and the ongoing proposal p 2 Pi(h).
Now recall that players are conservative and only go for certain prots: If
dierent beliefs lead to dierent subsequent actions from the other players, a
deviation may or may not be protable under all such scenarios.
Denition 4. The strategy prole  is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (with






Denition 5. A stationary perfect equilibrium  is a strategy prole that is
both subgame-perfect and stationary.
The set of stationary perfect equilibrium partitions coincide with the re-
cursive core (K oczy, 2009) (for games with nonempty residual cores). This
equivalence result predicts that games with empty residual cores do not have
stationary perfect equilibria.
Bloch (1996) presents a 3-player example, where player 1 would like to form a
coalition with 2, 2 with 3, 3 with 1. This game does not have stationary-perfect
equilibria. Since residual games are also partition function form games, the
smallest residual game for which the corresponding subgame of the sequential
game has no stationary strategies has an empty core. By a suciently large
payo for the grand coalition the core of the original game is nevertheless empty.
Perfectness only holds globally, that is, if the tiniest subgame fails to have
stationary perfect equilibria this imperfection spreads to the entire game. On
11the other hand, just as the recursive core may be non-empty even if the game
has empty residual cores, with a weaker concept of perfection we may retain an
essentially perfect behaviour in the corresponding sequential coalition formation
games, too.
Time-consistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) merely requires that the
equilibrium strategy does not need revision and thus will naturally be unaf-
fected by empty cores in subgames elsewhere. Clearly, most subgames are never
reached so it is superuous to insist on this property everywhere, on the other
hand time-consistency does not check deviations carefully enough. Subgame-
consistency, that we introduce soon is the right compromise and in the following
we study strategies where the perfectness/consistency criterion is not checked
per se for every subgame, but is only required in relevant subgames.
Denition 6. For a strategy prole  and belief  a subgame at history h is
relevant if
1. h is the original game (K(h) = p(h) = ?), or
2. there exists a modication 0 and a belief h such that
(a)  and 0 dier in a single action in history h, resulting in the set D
forming partition D = K(h) n P(;) leaving the game,
(b) K(h)  P(0;h), and
(c) xD(0;h) > xD(;h), or
3. it is a relevant subgame of a relevant subgame.
The rst case is trivial. In Case 2 we consider an elementary irreversible
deviation (the wrong set D of players or the wrong partition D exits), that
is, nevertheless protable for D under some belief. Finally if some elementary
deviation results in a subgame this subgame is relevant and of course after the
departure of some of the original players, it is a game on its own, and is therefore
evaluated the very same way: we want to check relevant subgames.
Denition 7. The strategy prole  is a subgame-consistent equilibrium3 if
3In this equilibrium concept perfectness is only required in the neighbourhood of the equi-
librium strategies and so the name quasi-perfect equilibrium would be more appropriate.






 restrictions to subgames relevant for  are also subgame-consistent.
Denition 8. A stationary consistent equilibrium  is a strategy prole that
is both subgame-consistent and stationary.
We denote the set of stationary consistent equilibria by SCE(N;V ) and
outcomes resulting from playing such equilibrium strategies by 
(N;V ).
3 Results
Theorem 1. Let (N;V ) be a partition function form game. Then its recur-
sive core C(N;V ) coincides with the set 
(N;V ) of outcomes supported by
stationary consistent equilibrium strategy proles.
The rest of this section is devoted to the inductive proof of this theorem. As
the proof is long, we break it into a number of propositions and nally present
a summary of these results. The rst proposition requires no proof:
Proposition 2. Let (f1g;V ) be a trivial, single-player partition function form
game. Then C(f1g;V ) = 
(f1g;V ).
Now assume that Theorem 1 holds for all games with less than k players. In
the following we extend it to games with k players. In order to show 
(N;V ) =
C(N;V ), rst we show 
(N;V )  C(N;V ) then 
(N;V )  C(N;V ).
Lemma 3. If Theorem 1 holds for all games with up to k 1 players, 
(N;V ) 
C(N;V ) for all k-player games.
Proof. If 
(N;V ) = ? the result is trivial, otherwise there exists a SCE 
producing !(;) = (x(;);P(;)) 2 
(N;V ) for some belief-function .
In particular, we assume that !(;) 62 C(N;V ) and prove contradiction.
Unfortunately that term is already taken and quasi-perfect equilibria (van Damme, 1984) are,
however not related to our concept, in fact even their relation to subgame perfect equilibria
is not well dened. Our concept is a weakening of subgame-perfectness.
13By this assumption there exists a protable deviation D by some set D of
players. The induced subgame has fewer players so the inductive assumption
can be applied. In the sequential game the deviation at h is expressed by the
strategy prole 0 against the original strategy prole , where 0(h0) = (h0)
for all h0  h. We discuss three cases.
Case 1. The induced subgame with K(h) = D, p(h) = ? is not relevant.
Then for all  i(h) there exists i 2 D and  such that xi(0;) < xi(;) {
thus the deviation cannot be protable in the cooperative game; contradiction.
Case 2. The resulting subgame is relevant, the core of the corresponding
residual subgame is empty. Then V (D;D [ PNnD) >
P
i2S xi(;) for all
PNnD. Since V (D;D [ PNnD) = minh2Bh
P
i2S xi(0;) a player in D should
immediately propose D. By subgame consistency all in D will accept. There-
fore  is not a stationary consistent equilibrium, moreover the outcome !(;)
cannot be supported by other equilibria either. Contradiction.
Case 3. The induced subgame is relevant and the core of the corresponding
residual subgame is not empty. Since  is a SCE its restriction h to this
relevant subgame (where K(h)  D and p(h) = ?) is stationary consistent, too.
Moreover the deviation from  to form D is not protable, therefore
xD(h;Bh) > xD(0h;Bh) (3.1)
On the other hand, by the inductive assumption,
!(h;h) 2 C(L(h);V D) 8(h): (3.2)
This, however, implies that the deviation D is not protable in the cooperative
game; contradiction.
We have discussed all cases, and found the assumptions contradicting. There-
fore !(;) 2 C(N;V ).
Punishment strategy Before we move on to our next lemma, we introduce
what we call the punishment strategy. A strategy-prole can only form an equi-
librium if it species a \response" to each deviation that deems these deviations
unprotable. In the recursive core a deviation is only protable if it represents
an improvement in the payos for all residual assumptions. In the sequential
14game, however, primary deviations can be punished, but due to stationarity,
but with multiple departed coalitions nding the right punishment is dicult.
Consider the following example. In equilibrium players obtain a payo x.
Suppose coalitions A and B have left the game and they do not form a subset of
the equilibrium partition (for simplicity: none of them do), therefore someone
has deviated. If A deviated rst N nA (including B) should stop this deviation
producing payo yA such that yA
A < xA. When B deviates, too, the remaining
N n A n B should also choose an action to get a payo zB such that zB
B < yA
B.
Consequently B does not deviate, yA forms which is bad for A, hence A does
not deviate and the equilibrium is preserved.
If, however N n A n B are misinformed and think B deviated rst. They
want response yB, which A did not comply with thus A must be punished by
zA, where yB





A > xA the response does
not work. Fortunately, when the deviations are made it is not yet known what
will be the belief of N n A n B: it can also be the correct history.
In the following we specify the punishment strategy to a deviation knowing
that some other coalitions left, too. We assume that K has already left the
game, but D was (or at least we think it was) the last to exit. Consider a
proposal p = (D;w). In the partition function form game (N n K [ D;V KnD)
the partition D, as a deviation, denes a residual game (N nK;V K). We discuss
two cases based on the emptiness of the core of this residual game.
If the residual core is not empty a \punishment strategy" to D is (~ xDjK; ~ PD) 2
C(N n K;V K) ensuring that the deviation D is not protable. That is, ~ PDjK
satises4
9S 2 D : V (S;K [ ~ PDjK) <
X
i2S
~ xi; or (3.3)




Since (~ x; ~ P) 2 C(N;V ) such a ~ PDjK exists for all deviations D. Without loss of










If the residual core is empty we observe that in order for a deviation to
be protable it must be protable for all residual partitions. Since (~ x; ~ P) 2
4Observe that from the point of view of externalities only the residual partitions matter,
and therefore we ignore payos.
15C(N;V ), in the partition function form game the deviation is not protable
guaranteeing the existence of a residual partition ~ PDjK 2 NnD satisfying





Lemma 4. If Theorem 1 holds for all games with less than k players, then

(N;V )  C(N;V ) for all k-player games (N;V ).
Proof. The proof is inspired by that of Bloch (1996, Proposition 3.2) in part,
and is by construction. We show that if (~ x; ~ P) 2 C(N;V ) there exists a station-
ary consistent strategy prole ~  such that for all  we have P(~ ;) = ~ P and
x(~ ;) = ~ x. Let ~ w = ~ xi P
j2 ~ P(i) ~ xj.
In the following we dene the stationary strategy ~ i for player i. Due to sta-
tionarity it is sucient to specify the strategy for each triple (K;p;B) consisting
of the partition of players who have already quit, the current proposal and the
current belief (thus B  K).
~ i(K;T ;w;B) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
( ~ w; ~ P) if K = T = ?
( ~ wBjK; ~ PBjK) if T = ?, but K 6= ?
accept if xi(~ ;T ;w;(K;B)) > xi(~ ;(K;B))
wait otherwise.
(3.5)
In equilibrium P(~ ) = ~ P and the strategy is stationary by construction so
we only need to verify subgame-consistency. We show this by induction. As
subgame-consistency holds for a trivial game we may assume that it holds for
all games of size less than jNj.
Now consider game (N;V ) and observe that if K departed to form K the
subgame is simply a coalition formation game with less players. We discuss two
cases based on the emptiness of the residual core.
1. If the residual core is not empty, the proposed strategy exhibits the same
similarity property: in equilibrium the core partition is proposed and accepted,
while residual cores form o-equilibrium.
The inductive assumption then ensures that the o-equilibrium path is subgame-
consistent so we only need to check whether a deviation T is ever accepted.
16This deviation corresponds to a deviation in the partition function game. Since
(~ x; ~ P) 2 C(N;V ), by the construction of ( ~ wBjK; ~ PBjK) we know that for some B
there exists a player in T for whom the deviation T is not protable. Given the
pessimism of the players, this is sucient to deter this player from accepting
the proposal to deviate.
2. If the residual core is empty, the deviation is not protable irrespective
of the residual partition that forms, the subgame is not relevant, and therefore
the second condition for subgame-consistency is satised.
The emptiness of the residual core, by our assumption, also implies that
there are no stationary consistent equilibrium strategy proles. In the absence
of such strategy proles the players in T cannot predict the partition of PNnK
{ in this case, by Expression 2.3, they individually expect the worst. As T only
forms if it is protable, it will, only, if it is protable for all xi(~ ;T ;w;(K;B))
for all B. Since (~ x; ~ P) 2 C(N;V ) this is not the case. This, on the other
hand implies that the formation of ~ P is unaected by possible deviations in this
subgame, meeting the rst condition of subgame-consistency.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by induction. The result holds for trivial,
single-player games. Assuming that the result holds for all k   1 player games,
the result for k-player games is a corollary of Lemmata 3 & 4.
4 Conclusion
Theorem 1 holds for arbitrary games in discrete partition function form, but
of course it is most interesting for games where some of the residual cores are
empty. When a proposal is made in a game without externalities the invited
players do not even (need to) consider the residual game and therefore the
emptiness of a residual core is not addressed. Huang and Sj ostr om (2006) and
K oczy (2009) simply restrict their attention to games where the residual cores
are non-empty, in fact the r-core (Huang and Sj ostr om, 2003) is not even dened
for games with empty residual cores. As already pointed out by K oczy (2007)
this is not only an enormous limitation given the number of conditions such
games must satisfy (one for each residual game), but the denitions/results do
not apply to some games without externalities and so they are not generali-
17sations of the well-known results for TU-games. The present paper heals this
deciency.
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